The Supreme Court, by a 9-5 vote, reinstated Rosalinda A. Penera as mayor of the municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte as it granted her motion for reconsideration and set aside its September 11, 2009 decision, which earlier had affirmed her disqualification by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) for premature campaigning.
In a 16-page resolution penned by Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the Court En Banc also set aside the resolutions dated July 24, 2007 and January 30, 2008 by the Comelec Second Division and the Comelec en banc, respectively. Concurring were Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Justices Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
“We grant Rosalinda A. Penera’s motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision of 11 September 2009…The assailed decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law,” the Court said.
Penera’s disqualification stemmed from her alleged premature campaigning when she and her supported had a motorcade on March 29, 2007, a day before the start of the authorized campaign period for the May 2007 local and national elections. The Court held that the assailed decision reverses its ruling in Lanot v. Comelec, wherein the Court held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. It noted that Congress had elevated the Lanot doctrine into law under RA 8436.
Under the September 11, 2009 decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. The same considers a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a “candidate” even before the start of the campaign period. The Court ruled that under the law, “candidate” has been defined as “any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy” and that “any person who files certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing] shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.” It stressed that when “the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, and read together, these provisions of law do not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of the ballots until the start of the campaign period.”
“In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight – any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law,” the Court said. The Court further said that what the law says is “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.” Furthermore, the Court stressed that the law does not state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period.
“Congress has laid down the law – a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that ‘any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.’ Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that ‘any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period,’” said the Court.
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, and Mariano C. Del Castillo. Justice Roberto A. Abad wrote a separate dissenting opinion. (GR No. 181613, Penera v. Comelec, November 25, 2009)
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